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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission,
Pl,aintitf and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

GENERAL OIL COMP ANY, a Utah
corporation, et al.,
Defendant and Respondent.

11178

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent agrees with Appellant's Statement and
adds thereto the following Statement. Upon the filing of
the condemnation Complaint by the State, Respondent (referred to herein as the General Oil Company) admitted the
right to condemn, public use, necessity and proper project
design, leaving as the only issue for trial that of Just Compensation to be paid for the appropriation (R. 43). No
claim for severance damage was made by General Oil and
the case thus proceeded to trial on the single question of
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the fair market value of the condemned property as of
March 19, 1964 (R. 177).
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
In this regard, the Statement by the Plaintiff in its
Brief is incorrect. The matter was originally submitted to
trial before the Honorable Maurice Harding, District Judge,
sitting with a jury in February, 1967 (R. 127). From a
verdict of $4,147.52, the property owner moved for a new
trial and alternatively, for an additur to the verdict based
on alleged errors of law and the legal inadequacy of the
jury award (R. 132-134). Judge Harding granted the Defendant's motion by entering an additur of $10,852.48 to
the jury verdict, conditioned upon the State's acceptance
of the additur within 30 days; otherwise a new trial was
ordered (R. 137). The State refused such additur award
and thereupon petitioned this Court for interlocutory appeal
of the new trial and additur order, on the ground that
Judge Harding had manifestly abused his discretion and
judgment (Supr. Ct. No. 10903). Such interlocutory Petition was by the Court denied on May 9, 1967.
The case was set down and tried anew before the
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, District Judge, sitting with
a jury, in January, 1968. On the fourth day of trial, a
verdict was returned assessing Just Compensation in the
sum of $22,050.00 (R. 147). The State did not file a motion
for new trial or other relief before the trial Court, but
appealed directly from the judgment entered upon the
verdict (R. 247).
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY STATE ON APPEAL
The State, by its Appeal, seeks to nullify and void the
second trial before Judge Elton and the judgment entered
therein, by asking that this Court enter "judgment upon
the verdict of the jury returned in the first trial of this
action." (App. Br. p. 2). Alternatively, the State requests
in this Appeal a new and further trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff's fact statement, while mostly accurate,
is quite incomplete in its account of the evidence of trial.
Furthermore, it is apparent that the citations of Plaintiff
to the transcript are in error as to the first trial of the
case, since such transcript has not been designated by Plaintiff for inclusion in the record on appeal.1
So that the Court may have a full digest of the facts
upon which the new trial order was entered and of the
relevant factors in the market at the date of condemnation,
Defendant hereby makes its own Statement.
1. Property Development. The condemned property of
General Oil, consisting of 1.04 acre, was situated
on the west side of South University Avenue at
lAnd in fact, the transcript of the first trial before Judge Hardin_g
has not been certified to the Court as a part of the record.. It is
Respondent's understanding, however, that tJ:~ reported transcnpt of
the first trial is prepared and could be certified and made. available
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 75(h) U.R.C.P. if deemed
material to Appellant's appeal.
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approximately 1500 South in Provo City (R. 330,
367, 408). Its frontage on the Avenue was some
316 feet with full access (R. 408). When the Defendant purchased the property in 1957 as a potential
service station site, the parcel lay within an agri-·
cultural zone of the City (R. 271, 300). In 1958, as
result of planning on the part of the State Road
Commission and Provo City, of community meetings
and of public hearings, it became a matter of public
and common knowledge that Interstate Highway 15
would be constructed and developed in the south
Provo area on a northwest-southeast diagor.al crossing South University Avenue at approximately 1700
South (R. 239-245, 268, 269, 284), and that South
University Avenue would serve as the main south
access-way of Provo to and from the Freeway (R.
250).
2. Zoning. In 1959, in contemplation of the freeway
coming through the south Provo area and of South
University Avenue serving as the Interstate connector street, the subject property, along with others
having frontage on th~ west side of the A venue
between 900 South and 1600 South, was rezoned by
Provo City from agricultural to a special highway
service zone, S-3 (R. 270). The zone, specially enacted for the property of Defendant and others
along South University, was highly restrictive in its
scope (R. 277-281, Ex. D-6), permissive uses under
the ordinance being limited to service stations, motels,
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5
restaurants, and other allied highway service purposes.
3. Other Developments. A further public hearing was
held in 1961 as well as other public and private meetings regarding the corridor alignment of the freeway through south Provo and the interchange at
South University Avenue at 1700 South (R. 267-270).
The buying public had notice of such meetings and
hearings and of the freeway alignment via news
media and public maps. By 1963, actual freeway
construction was commenced in the west Provo area
including the development and opening of the West
Center Street interchange (R. 257-259). At that
time, final planning and designing of the freeway
and the South University Avenue interchange had
been accomplished and some freeway construction
had actually taken place (R. 257, 542-544). As of
March 1964, it was a matter of general information
that the State Highway Department planned to complete the freeway and interchange system at South
University Avenue and open the same to traffic in
the Fall of 1966. 2 (R. 258, 283, 422, 542.) The foregoing factors were received in evidence as elements
of which the informed and prudent buyer and seller
in .the market place would have been aware in the
Spring of 1964, with respect to the subject property
(R. 244, 268-269, 336-342, 416-418, 421).
2completion and opening .o~ the freeway and interchange took place
in November, 1966, as anticipated. (R. 543)
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4. Condemnation. In March 1964, the property of General Oil was condemned not for the freeway, but for
the widening of South University Avenue which was
to serve as the access road to the freeway (Ex. D-1).
Sewer, water and other utilities were available to
the property as of that date (R. 301, 408) .

1

5. Highest and Best Use - Potential Commerci-OJl.
While the actual use of the subject property and
others in the area along South University Avenue
was predominately agricultural, the development and
imminency of the freeway system had for some time
prior to 1964 provoked substantial market interest
for commercial use (R. 304-305, 310). Prior to condemnation, buyers representing motel and service
station concerns, had contacted owners along South
University Avenue within the S-3 zone (R. 304-310),
and several sales were thereafter made reflecting
the commerdal value of the area (R. 287-289, 358360, 439-440).
I. Dale Despain, the City Planner of Provo for

23 years testified that in light of the S-3 zoning, .
the planned freeway in the area, and the demonstrated interest for commercial development along
South University Avenue, the highest and best use
of the subject property as of March 1964, was potential commercial (R. 285-287). The two evaluation
witnesses for General Oil concurred in the judgment
- that because of the zoning, market knowledge of
the actual plans for the freeway system and the
,
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interchange on South University Avenue to be constructed within approximately two years, and because of the intensive commercial use of the property
along the Avenue to be reasonably expected in the
foreseeable future, the willing and informed buyer
and seller would be motivated to buy and sell the
condemned property for its commercial potential as
of the date of condemnation and in the foreseeable
future (R. 339, 422).
6. Landowners Value Witnesses. The experts for General Oil based their estimates of market value on
commercial transactions in the immediate area, 3 a
holding period of two years on the subject property
being considered (R. 340, 361-364, 418-435). Th~
evaluation estimates of Defendant's witnesses of
$75.00 a front foot and $.53 a square foot for the
subject property as of March 1964, was substantially
supported by competent evidence (R. 367, 448).
7. State's Value Witnesses. It was the theory of the
two appraisers for the Plaintiff that notwithstanding
the foregoing, the highest and best use of Defend-·
ant's property was agricultural or transitional as of
March 1964 (R. 523, 572). It was their collective
opinion that farming would have been the motivating force in the purchase and sale of the property,
3The State is in error in its Brief, page 3, by the statement that the
appraisals of the owner were based on service station site s~es on
West Center Street. To the contrary, market value was premised on
South University Avenue transactions, and West Center sales w~z:e
used by General Oil witnesses to demonstrate. only the market 3;Dtlc1pation and influence in advance of the opemng of a freeway mterchange on West Center.
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commercial potential being rejected as a speculative
use of the unforeseeable future (R. 529, 640).
Neither appraiser reflected any value, whatsoever,
to the commercial zoning or to the imminent influence of the freeway upon the marketability of the
premises (R. 549-550, 639).
Both witnesses for the Plaintiff evaluated the
condemned property at $3,000.00 per acre (R. 505,
598) . On cross-examination, it was revealed thait
each witness had previously appraised substantially
similar property at 1200 South University Avenue,
located in the same S-3 zone, and as of the same time
in 1964, for $10,000.00 and $12,000.00 per acre, respectively (R. 556, 643).

8. Instructions and Verdict. Instruction No. 7 of the
Court's charge advised the jury that in determining
the market value of the condemned property, those
factors which affected and influenced land use and
land value as of the time of condemnation and within
the foreseeable future could be taken into account,
including any enhancement ,if any, in value brought
about by the freeway development as would have been
reasonably foreseen as of March 1964 (R. 180).
Plaintiff has not raised as error in this appeal the
giving of such Instruction.
From a jury verdict of $22,050.00, Plaintiff undertook its appeal to this Court directly. No motion for
new trial was filed before the lower Court.
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9. Earlier Trial. The case was first tried before District Judge Maurice Harding in February 1967 (R~
129). From a verdict of $4,147.52, General Oil moved
for a new trial and alternatively, for an addirtur to
the verdict. It is not contested by Plaintiff but what
there was substantial and competent evidence to SU'J>port the new trial and additur Motion. (App. Br. p.
3, 4). The Motion was granted by Judge Harding,
and it was ordered that an additur be entered to
the verdict of the jury or a new trial be had if the
additur were not accepted by the Plaintiff (R. 137).
The State in its Brief has not referred the Court
to any transcript citation to support the claim that
the new trial and additur Order of Judge Harding
lacked substantiality in the evidence of the first
trial or that Judge Harding abused his discretion by
the Order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
JUDGE HARDING DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING

A NEW TRIAL BASED ON THE INADEQUATE
AWARD OF DAMAGES AND OTHER ERRORS OF
LAW.

1. The granting of a new trial lies within the sound

discretion of the trial judge and such order will not
be overturned on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly and manifestly apparent.
The basic claim of Plaintiff's Appeal herein is that
District Judge Harding, in ordering a new trial because of
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whether the verdict returned is against the clear weight
of the evidence so as to indicate bias, prejudice or misunderstanding, and whether the verdict represents substantial
justice in the matter. This post-verdict function has long
been accepted in Utah as the rightful duty and responsibility
of the trial judge. Paul v. Kirkenda!1l, 1 U.2d 1, 261 P.2d
670 (1953); Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701
(1961). The rule is fundamental in this jurisdiction that
the trial judge has wide discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial and additur under Rule 59. Thus in the
early case of Lehi Irrigation Co. v. Moyle, 4 Utah 327, 9 Pac.
867 (1886), this Court said:
"Motions for new trials are always addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, and whether
granted or denied, the discretion of the trial court
will be presumed to have been properly exercised,
and will be so held unless the contrary be made
clearly to appear."
"Wide latitude" was the description given to the trial
Court's discretion on new trial motions in Beck v. Dutchrnan Coalition Mines Co. 2 U.2d 104, 269 P.2d 867 (1954).
And in Klinge v. Southern Pacific Co. 89 Utah 284, 57 P.2d
367 (1936), it was held that such wide discretion will not
be lightly regarded or overturned by this Court on appeal:
"Hence, a wide discretion is given the trial
court in such matter and rarely is interferred with
by an appellate tribunal whether the awarded compensation by the court below was held adequate or
inadequate." P. 297 of 89 Utah.
In reality, the argument of Plaintiff herein reduces the
role of the trial judge to that of a ministerial officer. It
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the legal inadequacy of the damage award, committed prejudicial error entitling Plaintiff to a reversal of the Order
and a reinstatement of the initial jury verdict. That Order
made under Rule 59 and on motion of the Defendant, found
and declared that the jury award of $4,147.53 was "as a
matter 'Of law, inadequate and that good cause supports
Defendant's Motion." (R. 137). The motion made by Defendant cited as grounds for new trial that the verdict was
against the clear weight of the testimony under any reasonable view of the evidence so as to manifest prejudice and
misunderstanding by the jury, and was further based on
errors of law independent of the inadequacy of the jury
award.
Plaintiff's argument is that the trial court's function
is limited to the impanelment of the jury, ruling upon
evidence and instructing upon the applicable law. So far
as the review of the adequacy or inadequacy of a damage
award by the jury, Plaintiff contends that the trial judge
has no involvement. Thus, it is concluded that Judge Harding had no authority to review the verdict on just compensation or to order a new trial because of its inadequacy.
(App. Br. p. 4).
A fair diagnosis of such argument quickly reveals its
error. For not only does the argument fail in the end
result, but its very structure rests upon a misconception of
the inherent function of the trial judge. For that function
is not only one of an administrator during the jury trial as
Plaintiff argues, but consists also of conducting, upon motion or sua sponte, a post-verdict review to determine
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does nDt recognize the implicit power and discretion which
Judge Harding possessed and exercised in granting the
new trial motion. Plaintiff was not by such Order denied
its right of trial by jury as possibly might be the case on
a Judgment N.O.V. Jury trial was fully preserved to the
parties and in fact, the ma1Jter was subsequently tried to
and determined by a jury before Judge Elton after the
Plaintiff refused the additur award of Judge Harding.
2. The rule of wide discretion of the trial judge on
new trial motion is observed in eminent domain
1litigation.
In the review of an eminent domain verdict to determine its legal adequacy or inadequacy, there is no break
with the dominant rule that the trial judge maintains broad
discretion to grant a new trial because of the inadequacy
of the damage award. As noted in 27 Am. Jur. 2d 364,
Sec. 448 Em. Dom., the power to order a new trial is fully

maintained:
"The trial court has a wide discretion in granting a new trial in a condemnation case. It is held
that where the court is dissatisfied with the verdict
in eminent domain proceedings, the court has not
only the authority but also the duty to set the verdict
aside and grant a new trial. Similarly, it is held
to be the duty of the trial court to set aside a verdict
in eminent domain and grant a new trial 'Where
it appears to the court that the verdict is inadequate
under the evidence." (Emphasis added)
In holding that the trial judge has the responsibility
to determine under a new trial motion, whether a con-
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dernnation verdict was a legally inadequate assessment of
damages, the South Dakota Supreme Court stated in State
Highway Commission v. Madsen, 119 N.W. 2d 924 (S. D.
1963):
"The trial judge has the primary responsibility
for determining whether a new trial should be
granted because of inadequate damages. In making
that decision he is vested with a broad judicial
discretion. Manifestly because of his participation in
the trial he is in a far better position than are the
judges of this court to say whether the award does
substantial justice. Consequently we may not disturb his decision except for a clear abuse of that
discretion."
To the same effect is Abercrombie v. Kansas Stat,e
Highway Commission, 185 Kan. 47, 340 P.2d 377 (1959).
This Court in Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller, 15
U.2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964) sustained an additur and
new trial order of the trial Court entered because of the
latter's findings that the severance damage verdict of the
jury was inadequate. In so doing, this Court held firm to
the rule that:
"Granting or denying a new trial is largely in
the discretion of the trial court."
3. Judge Harding found as a matter of law, that the

jury verdict was legally inadequate.
The record is clear on the point that Judge Harding,
in granting the new trial Order of which the State herein
laments, did not simply substitute his judgment of damages for that of the jury. It was not, as the Plaintiff seems
to contend, just a case of the trial court disagreeing with
a jury verdict. Rather, it was the judgment of Judge
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Harding that this verdict was, as a matter of law, against
the manifest weight of the evidence at trial, i.e., that reasonable minds would not differ that in light of the testimony
adduced, the damage award of the jury was clearly inadequate. In such conclusion, Judge Harding came within the
full measure of his discretion as outlined by this Court
under the ruling law cited herein as well as within the
framework of the recent opinion in Haslam v. Paulsen, 15
U.2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1966):
"While we agree that the trial court cannot,
without any reason whatsoever, grant such a motion [new trial] upon mere whim or caprice, it
nevertheless has a wide latitude of discretion with
respect thereto in conformity with the general supervisory powers which it necessarily has over the verdicts of juries in the interest of the administration
of justice."
POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WHOLLY FAILED IN THIS
APPEAL

TO

DEMONSTRATE

WHEREIN

JUDGE

HARDING ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL.

1. The presumption is in favor of the new trial Order

and against the Plaintiff.
While plaintiff has expressed its displeasure with the
new trial Order of Judge Harding, it has fallen short of the
required mark of demonstrating wherein the trial court
manifestly or clearly abused its discretion in the matter.'
•This Court has left no doubt in its decisions that to turn back a new
trial order of a District Judge, the appellant has the b~rden of show·
ing there to be a manifest or clea:r abuse .of d1scret10n. Klinge v.
Southern Pacific Co., supra; Lehi Irrigation Compan?' v. Moyle,
supra. "Manifest and clear" normally mi;ans that then~ is no reason·
able basis, whatsoever, to support the rulmg. State v. Fischer, 38 N.J.
40, 183 A.2d 11. (1962)
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It has not referred this Court to a solitary fact that would

reasonably form the basis for a claim of manifest and clear
abuse. To the contrary, Plaintiff relies on the argument
that since there was some evidence admitted in the first
trial from which the jury might find for the Plaintiff ,
that such evidence forecloses the trial judge from finding
the damage award to be legally inadequate. (See App. Br.
p. 4 last para). The trouble with such argument is that it
was rejected out of hand in Wellman v. Noble, 12
U.2d 350, 366, P.2d 701 (1961). In sustaining the lower
court's order of a new trial because of inadequate damages,
this Court said therein:
"The court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial.
The trial court has a broad discretion in ruling
on such a motion which we should not disturb unless
there is a plain abuse thereof. * * *

* * * The mere fact that the jury verdict is
supported by substantial evidence sufficient to make
a prima facie case and furnish a reasonable basis
for their decision does not require that the trial
court's order granting a new trial should be reversed.
This is especially true where the order for the new
trial is based on the amount of the verdict."

The Court went on to say in Wellman that on the question
of inadequacy of damages, if there was substantial evidence
to support the motion for new trial, the trial judge will
not be deemed to have abused his discretion:
"This court has held in determining whether
there has been an abuse of discretion, that where
there is substantial evidence showing a reasonable
basis to support a verdict in favor of the party mov-
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to damages." Paul v. Kirkendall, supra. The new trial
Order of Judge Harding was clearly within his discretion
under the wilderness of precedent of this Court and should
stand affirmed.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RECEIVING
EVIDENCE ON MARKET VALUE BASED IN PART
ON FACTORS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE IMMINENT FREEWAY PROJECT.

1. Under the Ward deC'ision in Utah, evidence of

e11r

hancement in value of the condemned property as
well as of enhanced comparable properties is a
proper element of consideration in determining market value.
Little time need be taken with Point II of Plaintiff's
Appeal, for the issue of law raised there has been fully
settled by the decision of this Court in Weber Basin CQnscrv. District v. Ward, 10 U.2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1949).
Simply stated, it is Plaintiff's claim that elements of value
which are referable to or caused by the development of the
proposed freeway project are not admissible and are not
compensable in fixing the market value of the subject
property, which was condemned for the widening of an
access-road to the freeway. Accordingly, factors in the
market, including sales of comparable property, which have
been influenced by the imminency of the freeway development are not, under Plaintiff's argument, relevant on the
compensation issue. This argument was advanced by the
Plaintiff on several occasions before Judge Harding
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ing for a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion
in granting a new trial."
That there was substantial evidence underlying the motion for new trial of General Oil in the case at bar, is not
open for debate. Plaintiff, in fact, acknowledges substantialit3'. The rationale of Wellman is dispositive of Plaintiff's
argument and of its appeal herein. Pla:intiff cites as its only
other authority for reversal of the Harding new trial Order,
the decision of this Court in Lund v. Phillips Petro1leum Co. 5
That case does not at all control this Appeal, for involved
therein was the issue of whether the trial court committed
error in permitting a case to go to the jury and in the
subsequent refusal of the judge to disturb the verdict. If
Lund stands for anything in the case at hand, it upholds
the principal of discretion of the trial judge in granting
or denying a new trial.
The law presumes that the new trial Order of Judge
Harding was regular and that it was made upon proper
foundation. As stated by this Court in Klinge v. Southern
Pacif~c

Co., supra:
"The rule is well established that a presumption
exists that a trial court did not err or abuse his
discretion in granting or refusing a new trial, and
that the burden is upon him complaining of the ruling to show a clear abuse of discretion."

The Plaintiff's burden as required by Klinge has not
been met in this Appeal. In the absence of a clear showing
thereof, this Court is "slow to interfere with a trial court's
ruling granting or r~fusing a new trial on questions relating
s 10 U.2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960)
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v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1942) to the effect that the value
of property for condemnation should be determined "without consideration for the fact that the condemnor plans
improvements." In its opinion, this Court first referred to
the Miller doctrine and then expressly rejected the same by
holding that all factors (including enhancement of value
from the public project) could be taken into consideration'
by the trier of fact in determining the fair market value of
the condemned property:
"The basis of the attack made upon the defendants' expert evidence is that they relied upon the
increased value of the land occasioned by Weber
Basin's plans for improvement of the area in increasing farm values thereabouts. * * * The argument
supporting such rule appears to be that the condemnee should not be allowed an advantage from
the fact that the condemnor is improving the area
and the latter be required to pay a higher price and
thus in effect suffer a penalty because of its own
improvements. The contrary view is that eminent
domain statutes are designed only to give the condemnor the power to purchase property whether the
condemnee desires to sell or not, but are not purposed to give the condemnor any superior bargaining position as to price.

We are in accord with what appears to be the
better view, adopted by the trial court, that the condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his
property at the time of the service of summons
in the condemnation proceedings as provided by
statute; and that all factors bearing upon such value
that any prudent purchaser would take into account
at that time should be given consideration, including
any potential development in the area reasonably
to be expected."
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(including an earlier and independent case) and in th:e trial
before Judge Elton from which Plaintiff now appeals. Both
Judges Harding and Elton ruled against Plaintiff's argument and permitted evidence of enhancement in value from
the freeway project, such rulings being largely made on the
strength of the Ward decision.
Plaintiff cites as authority for its argument an encyclopedia and three cases from other jurisdictions. 6 But it has
ignored and failed to even cite in its Appeal Brief the
plain holding of this Court in the Ward case. Indeed,
"ignore" is a proper characterization of the Plaintiff's Brief
herein, for the Ward decision and its rationale was fully
researched, explored and argued by both parties before '
both trial Judges Harding and Elton.
The answer to the contention made by Plaintiff was
laid to rest in Weber Basin Conserv. District v. Ward, for
the Court therein held, without dissent, that factors in the
market attributable to the public project for which the
property in question is condemned, may be taken into consideration in determining the fair market value of the
condemned property. In Ward as here, the condemnor
argued that the judgment of the trial court was erroneous,
since the testimony of the owner on market value was based
on the increased value of the condemned Uind which the
water project of condemnor brought about in the area.
In so arguing, the Conservancy District relied upon U. S.
s These citations are unauthoritative and should carry no weight with
this Court for they all have their footings in th~ doctri:r:I'. announced
in U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1942), which declSlon was expressly rejected by this Court in Ward.
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CONCLUSION
It is plain that the new trial Order of Judge Harding
is substantially supported by the record and testimony in
the case and is presumed proper. The Plaintiff has not met
its burden of showing such Order to be an abuse of discretion whatsoever, much less making a showing of manifest
and clear abuse. It was Judge Harding who heard the
·witnesses, who had a first hand view of all the evidence and
proceedings throughout the trial and who observed strategy
of counsel and the reaction of the jury. His judgment on
new trial matters cannot under the ruling precedent of this
Court be overturned, it is submitted.
The rulings of the trial court on the admissibility of
the evidence relating to market value as enhanced by the
imminency of the freeway project, was in full accord with
the unequivocal holding of this Court in Weber Basin Cons1ru. District v. Ward. There was no error committed.
The judgment of the trial court herein should be
affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR.
STEWART M. HANSON, JR.
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
General Oil Company
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It is apparent from the record herein that the property
of General Oil, at the date of condemnation, had been for
better than six years past situated in a market which was
fairly teeming with activity and interest oriented toward
freeway development and the South University Avenue
Interchange. Zoning, utility services, public hearings, and
market attitudes were all geared toward the potential and
commercial use of the area proximately due to the im- '
minency of the freeway project. To have placed a veil over 1
the trial so as to eliminate that primary factor as an element of market value (which is what the State would have
had us do) would have been to create a false and hypothetical market which never in fact existed. The appraisal
process, itself, under such an artificial system would become
a hopeless attempt to evaluate the subject property under
market conditions which were plainly not prevalent. The
guiding philosophy of the Ward decision requires that the
parties look the facts in the face and that just compensation
be tied to the genuine realities of the extant market.
1

In his charge to the jury, Judge Elton instructed in
accordance with the Ward decision, "that all factors whfoh
the prudent buyer and seller would take into account including market value influence caused by the construction
and development of any public improvement or project at
the time or within the reasonably foreseeable future" were
proper considerations for the jury in arriving at its verdict.
The State has not alleged as error in this Appeal the giving
of such Instruction. (See Instruction No. 7, R. 180).
The rule and charge on the evidential issue were proper
and should be affirmed.
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